Consider two competitors in the hardware industry, Handy Hardware and Tradie Heaven. Both firms can simultaneously choose to Discount or Not (discount). If both firms Discount the payoffs are 15 to each firm. If both firms choose Not to discount, the payoffs are 25 to each firm. If Handy Hardware chooses Discount and Tradie Heaven chooses Not, Handy gets 30 and Tradie gets 10. If Handy Hardware chooses Not to discount and Tradie Heaven chooses Discount, Handy gets 10 and Tradie gets 30. What is the outcome of this game?Group of answer choicesBoth firms choose Discount, and this is a prisoners’ dilemma.One firm chooses Not and the other Discount.None of the other answers are correct.Both firms choose Not.Both firms choose Discount but this is not a prisoners’ dilemma.

Consider two firms in the hardware store market in Sydney, Handy Hardware (HH) and Tradie Heaven (TH). The timing of the game is that first HH chooses to Discount (D) or Not Discount (ND). Having observed its rival’s choice, TH can then choose to either D or ND. The payoffs are as follows. If both firms chose D, each firm gets a profit of 2. If both firms opted for ND, each firm also gets 2. If HH chose D and TH opted for ND, HH gets 5 and TH 1. Conversely, if HH chose ND and TH went for D, the payoffs are 1 to HH and 5 to TH. What is the credible equilibrium outcome in this game?Group of answer choices(ND, ND)(D, ND)(D, D)(ND, D)Either (D, ND) or (ND, D)

Consider a pricing game between Coles and Woolworths. Each firm simultaneously chooses whether to price High or Low. If both firms price Low, the payoffs are 8 to Coles and 2 to Woolworths. If both firms choose High, the payoffs are 3 to Coles and 7 to Woolworths. If Coles opts for Low and Woolworths High, Coles gets 5 and Woolworths 4. Finally, if Coles plays High and Woolworths Low, Coles gets 7 and Woolworths receives a payoff of 6. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesthe outcome of the game is (Low, High), where Coles if playing the first strategy Low and Woolworths High; this game is a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (High, Low); this game is a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (Low, Low); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (High, High); this game is a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (High, High); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemma

Consider a pricing game between Coles and Woolworths. Each firm simultaneously chooses whether to price High or Low. If both firms price Low, the payoffs are 9 to each firm. If both firms choose High, each firm gets 7. If one firm chooses Low and the other High, the Low-priced firm gets 1 and the firm that opted for High gets 10. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesthe outcome of the game is (High, High); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (High, High); this game is a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (Low, Low); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (Low, Low); this game is a prisoners’ dilemmanone of the above

Consider Apple and Samsung considering developing an entering a new market (by developing a new type of device). Each firm simultaneously makes its choice whether or not to Enter (E) or to Not Enter (NE).  If both firms enter (E) the payoff is -5 to each firm. If both firms do not enter (NE) they each get a profit of 2. If one enters and the other chooses to NE, the entrant gets 10 and the other firm gets a profit of 0. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices. (NE, E) and (E, NE), where the first strategy in each parentheses is Apple’s and the second is Samsung’s(E, E)(E, NE)(E, E) and (NE, NE)(NE, E)

Consider Apple and Samsung considering developing an entering a new market (by developing a new type of device). The timing of the game is that Apple gets to choose whether to Enter (E) or to Not Enter (NE). Then, observing its rival’s choice, Samsung gets to choose whether to E or to NE. If both firms enter (E) the payoff is -5 to each firm. If both firms do not enter (NE) they each get a profit of 2. If one enters and the other chooses to NE, the entrant gets 10 and the other firm gets a profit of 0. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung also Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung chooses NE; there is a first-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung also chooses to Not Enter; there is a first-mover advantageNone of the above