Consider the following situation in an organization, represented by the game outlined below. In this organization, two workers, 1 and 2, play the game outline below two times (in two periods). In each period, both workers simultaneously choose their actions. After the first period, the actions chosen are revealed to everyone in the organization (that is, both workers). In the second period, both players again simultaneously choose their actions, as outlined in the normal-form game below. Note, the first payoff in each square is 1’s payoff (for that period); the second is the payoff of worker 2. image.png Where the first strategy in parentheses is 1’s and the second is 2’s, what is the actions do we see in a Nash equilibrium in both periods of the game? Group of answer choices (Cooperate, Cooperate) and (Cooperate, Renege) (Cooperate, Cooperate) and (Cooperate, Cooperate) (Renege, Renege) and (Renege, Renege) (Cooperate, Cooperate) and (Renege, Renege) (Renege, Renege) in the first period, and (Cooperate, Cooperate) in the second period.

Suppose the following normal form game is played twice. Players observe the actions chosen in the first period prior to the second period. Each player's total payoff is the sum of his/her payoff in the two periods.Consider the following strategy: Play A in period 1, play C in period 2 if the action profile in period 1 is (A;A), otherwise play B. What is the highest value of x>0 for which playing the stated strategy by both players is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the twice repeated game?  A B CA 1,  7 0,  4 0,  0B 4,   0 x   x 0,  0C 0,  0 0,  0 7, 1[Write your answer as a decimal number like 0.33]

Consider the following simultaneous stage game that is play twice. That is, there are two periods, and in each period the two players choose their actions simultaneously. The outcome in the first period is revealed before the players make their choices in the second period. Outline how in a subgame perfect equilibrium, it is possible to get (B, B) as the choice made in the first period. Explain the relevance to trust in organisations.

Consider the following sequential game. Wally first chooses L or H. Having observed Wally’s choice, Elizabeth chooses between A and F. The payoffs are as follows. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth chose A, the payoffs are 20 to Wally and 30 to Elizabeth. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 25 to Wally and 40 and to Elizabeth. If Wally decides to opt for H and Elizabeth A, the payoffs are 30 and 20 to Wally and Elizabeth, respectively. Finally, if Wally opts for H and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 20 to Wally and 50 to Elizabeth. What is the outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game?Group of answer choices(H,A)(L,F)(H,F)(L,A)(L,F) and (H,A)

Consider the three player normal form game described by the payoff matrices below.  Players 1 and 2 have two choices each while player 3 has three choices.  Player 3 choices correspond to each of the three matrices.  The payoffs in each cell are the payoffs of player 1, player 2, and player 3 respectively.Player 3 chooses U:  L Rl 1,0,1 0,1,1r 0,1,1 1,0,0Player 3 chooses M:  L Rl 1,1,1 -1,-1,1r -1,-1,1 1,1,1Player 3 chooses D:  L Rl 0,1,0 1,0,1r 1,0,1 0,1,1Which of the following statements is true? M is a strongly dominant action for player 3. U is a weakly dominant action for player 3. M is a weakly dominant action for player 3. D is a weakly dominant action for player 3.

Consider a firm in which a boss and a worker each simultaneously get to choose their actions. The boss can choose between centralizing (C) or delegating (D). The worker can put in low effort (L) or high effort (H). The payoffs are 2 to the boss and 2 to the worker if the choices are C and L. If the boss chooses D and the worker L the payoffs are (1,6) to the boss and worker, respectively. If the actions chosen are C and H the payoff are (6, 1). Finally, if the actions are D and H, the payoffs are 4 apiece. a. If the game is played once, what is the Nash equilibrium. Explain your answer. Could this represent an outcome in a real firm? b. What if the worker and boss meet twice, in which in the first period both make their choice of action simultaneously. Following this, the outcome (and payoffs) is revealed and the game proceeds to the next and final period. In the second period, again the parties simultaneously choose their actions, the payoffs are revealed and the game ends. What outcome do we see in both periods in the subgame perfect equilibria and why? c. Now assume that instead of meeting once or twice, the two players play the simultaneous-choice stage game an infinite number of times. In each period, the two players simultaneously make their choices, the outcome in that period is revealed to all and the players proceed to the next period. Each party discounts future periods by a discount factor δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.