WTO Member A believes that WTO Member B has violated WTO law. A and B are also signatories to a bilateral international agreement on student exchange. A therefore suspends - in proportionate amount - entry visas allocated to students from B. What can B do?Select one:a.If A has truly violated WTO law, it will have to accept the suspension of entry visas because this suspension is justified under international law as a countermeasure against A’s breach.b.B cannot have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system, as this system is applicable only to disputes brought pursuant to the consultations and dispute settlement provisions of one of the covered agreements.c.B can only have recourse to the forum of dispute resolution provided for in the agreement on student exchange.d.B can bring a WTO dispute against A on the basis of Article 23 of the DSU. A has made a unilateral determination on the question of a WTO violation.

WTO Member A has lost the case it brought against Member B because the panel and the Appellate Body have not accepted A’s legal interpretation of the agreement concerned and have concluded that B’s measure did not violate the WTO Agreement. A insists on its reading and recalls that panels and the Appellate Body must not diminish the rights of WTO Members. May A now impose unilateral sanctions against B despite the adoption of the reports?Select one:a.Panel and Appellate Body reports change the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement. If the reports have concluded that no violation has occurred, then this is the law from now on, and unilateral sanctions are illegal.b.Panel and Appellate Body reports are not able to add to or diminish rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. Therefore, if A’s legal interpretation is correct, it may suspend obligations vis-à-vis B. If B objects it can have a different panel and the Appellate Body clarify the correct interpretation of the provisions at issue.c.Panel and Appellate Body reports must not add to or diminish the Members’ rights and obligations. However, the extent of the rights and obligations is to be clarified in the dispute settlement system. Therefore, A may not make any unilateral determination that a violation has occurred. It also may not suspend obligations unilaterally.d.A must not apply unilateral sanctions, but it has a second chance: it can request a compliance panel to examine, pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, whether B’s measure truly complies with WTO law.

WTO Members A and B conclude a compromise, according to which a specific WTO dispute between A and B is to be resolved by the International Court of Justice in the Hague and according to the procedures set out in its Statute. Are A and B permitted to do so?Select one:a.For disputes under the covered agreements, Article 23.1 of the DSU mandates recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system and therefore does not permit the use of other procedures for resolving WTO disputes.b.The Statute of the International Court of Justice does not permit States to decide that the Court is competent.c.The priority of the WTO dispute settlement system is to secure a positive solution, if possible through a negotiated agreement. The negotiated agreement can also provide for any particular form of adjudication of the dispute.d.A and B may take their dispute to the International Court of Justice, but they need the approval of the DSB who would decide by consensus.

A panel has been requested to examine a dispute about an alleged violation of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. All three panel members believe it is not obvious that the challenged measure violates Article 3, however, the question of the existence or absence of a violation depends on the correct interpretation of Article 3. What should the panel do?Select one:a.The panel is not permitted to interpret Article 3 and must dismiss the complaint, as the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement rests with the Ministerial Conference and the General Council (Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement).b.The panel may proceed to an interpretation of Article 3, but it must consult the chairperson of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.c.The panel may proceed to an interpretation of Article 3 and, in that process, it must always give decisive weight to the negotiating history of Article 3.d.The panel is entitled and obliged to clarify the meaning of Article 3 by interpreting that provision in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.

The World Trade Organization provides two procedures for the resolution of disputes between countries. One way is to request the WTO Council to appoint a "panel" to adjudicate the dispute; the other way is        Group of answer choicesto refer the dispute to the Free Trade Commission for settlement.a consultation and, if necessary, conciliation procedure—essentially a diplomatic solution.to submit to the International Compensation Board, who will review the matter and publish a report with their recommendations.to turn over the matter to the International Mediation Review Board.Next

The World Trade Organization provides two procedures for the resolution of disputes between countries. One way is to request the WTO Council to appoint a "panel" to adjudicate the dispute; the other way is        Group of answer choicesto submit to the International Compensation Board, who will review the matter and publish a report with their recommendations.to turn over the matter to the International Mediation Review Board.to refer the dispute to the Free Trade Commission for settlement.a consultation and, if necessary, conciliation procedure—essentially a diplomatic solution.