Consider the game below with a worker (W) and a firm (F). The worker initially can choose to acquire skills or not acquire skills. If the worker does acquire skills, the firm then gets to decide whether to compensate the worker or not. The extensive form of the game and the payoffs are below. Which of the following is true?  Group of answer choicesThis game has a single Nash equilibrium.There are two Nash equilibria.There is no Nash equilibrium.Both players have a strictly dominant strategy.None of the above.

If each player in a game has a strictly dominant strategy, then:Group of answer choicesthe Nash equilibrium is welfare-maximising.each player achieves a maximum payoff in equilibrium.the game has no equilibrium.there cannot be multiple equilibria.the game can only played once.

Consider the following game below. Which of the following is true? Group of answer choicesThere is a unique Nash Equilibrium which is efficient.There are two Nash equilibria, both of which are efficient.There are two Nash equilibria, only one of which is efficient.There are two Nash equilibria, none of which are efficient.None of the above.

Consider a game in which Myer and DJs simultaneously choose whether to advertise (ADV) or not advertise (NOT). If both firms adopt NOT, the payoffs are (6, 10) to Myer and DJs, respectively. If both firms choose ADV, the payoffs are (5, 6). If Myer plays ADV and DJs NOT, the payoffs are (8, 5). Finally, if Myer plays NOT and DJs ADV the payoffs are (4, 12). Which statement is true? Group of answer choices The Nash equilibrium is (NOT, NOT); this game is a prisoners’ dilemma. The Nash equilibrium is (ADV, NOT); this game is a prisoners’ dilemma. The Nash equilibrium is (ADV, ADV); this game is a prisoners’ dilemma. The Nash equilibrium is (NOT, ADV); this game is a prisoners’ dilemma. The Nash equilibrium is (ADV, ADV); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemma.

Consider two workers 1 and 2 who simultaneously must choose between working on two projects, labelled A and B. The payoffs are as follows. If both 1 and 2 choose project A each worker gets 0. Similarly, if both workers choose B each gets 0. If worker 1 chooses B and worker 2 chooses A, each gets 10 and 3 (for worker 1 and 2) respectively. Finally, if 1 opts for A and worker 2 opts for B the payoffs to worker 1 and 2 are 8 and 7, respectively. a. What are the Nash equilibria of the game? Is this game a realistic one for an organisation? Explain your answer. What might an organisation do if it found itself in a situation similar to the one represented by this game. b. Now allow the game to be played sequentially. That is, allow worker 1 to make her choice first between projects A and B. Then, worker 1 choice is observed by worker 2 who then makes his choice. What are the subgame perfect equilibria of the game? Provide some intuition for your result. What does your answer say about the Coase theorem?

In a co-ordination style game:Group of answer choicesThere are multiple Nash equillibriaNone of the other answers are correct.The outcome of the game will be the Nash equillibrium with the highest payoff for both parties.There is a unique Nash equillibrium