Consider Google and Safari in a simultaneous-move game. Google can choose to play T or B. Safari can opt for an action of either L or R. The payoffs are as follows. If Google opts for T and Safari L, the payoffs are (8, 7) to Google and Safari, respectively. If the actions are B and L the payoffs are (3, 5). If the actions are (T, R) the payoffs are (3, 4). Finally, if Google opts for B and Safari R the payoffs are 2 to Google and 3 to Safari respectively. Which of the following statements are true?Group of answer choicesThe dominant strategy equilibrium is (T, L)Safari does not have a dominant strategyNone of the other answers are correct.The dominant strategy equilibrium is (B, R)The game is a prisoners's dilemmaGoogle has a dominant strategy

Consider a game in which Myer and DJs simultaneously choose whether to advertise (ADV) or not advertise (NOT). If both firms opt to ADV, the payoffs are 10 to Myer and 7 to DJs. If both firms choose NOT, the payoffs are (5,8) where the first payoff is Myer’s and the second DJs’. If Myer plays NOT and DJs ADV, the payoffs are (20, 6). Finally, if Myer plays ADV and DJs Not, the payoffs are (15, 12), respectively. Which statement is (most) true?Group of answer choicesDJs has a dominant strategy.Myer does not have a dominant strategy.Myer’s best response to a strategy of ADV by DJs is to play NOT.The Nash equilibrium is (ADV, NOT), for Myer and DJs respectively.All of the above statements are true.

Consider the following sequential game. Wally first chooses L or H. Having observed Wally’s choice, Elizabeth chooses between A and F. The payoffs are as follows. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth chose A, the payoffs are 30 to Wally and 20 to Elizabeth. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 40 to Wally and 10 and to Elizabeth. If Wally decides to opt for H and Elizabeth A, the payoffs are 10 and 2 to Wally and Elizabeth, respectively. Finally, if Wally opts for H and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 35 toWally and 5 to Elizabeth. What is the outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game?Group of answer choices(L,F)(H,A)(H,F) and (L,F)(L,A) and (H,F)(H,F)

Consider this following sequential game played by two investors. Cat chooses either to go long (L) of short (S). Cat’s choice is observed by rival Cutter. Cutter then can choose to either play Hard (H) or Diverse (D). The payoffs are as follows. Following (L, H) the payoffs are (300, 500) to Cat and Cutter, respectively. If the actions are L then D, the payoffs are (0, 0). If the actions are S and then H, the payoffs are (0, 0). Finally, if the actions are (S, D) the payoffs are (300, 500). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium we observe:Group of answer choicesS then DL then HS then HS then LS then D, or L then H.

Consider a pricing game between Coles and Woolworths. Each firm simultaneously chooses whether to price High or Low. If both firms price Low, the payoffs are 8 to Coles and 2 to Woolworths. If both firms choose High, the payoffs are 3 to Coles and 7 to Woolworths. If Coles opts for Low and Woolworths High, Coles gets 5 and Woolworths 4. Finally, if Coles plays High and Woolworths Low, Coles gets 7 and Woolworths receives a payoff of 6. Which statement is true?Correct!  the outcome of the game is (Low, High), where Coles if playing the first strategy Low and Woolworths High; this game is a prisoners’ dilemma   the outcome of the game is (High, Low); this game is a prisoners’ dilemma   the outcome of the game is (Low, Low); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemma   the outcome of the game is (High, High); this game is a prisoners’ dilemma

There are two players, 1 and 2. At the first stage, player 1 chooses whether to play the following simultaneous move game:  L RU 2,2 0,0D 0,0 4,4If player 1 chooses "play" at the first stage, player 1 and 2 play the above simultaneous move game; If player 1 choose "not play" at the first stage, both players get the payoff of 3. How many SPE does the game have?   Group of answer choices1234