Consider the game shown in the payoff matrix below. Assume this is a simultaneous game played only once, and players do not know what the other player is going to choose.Payoff Matrix for Two FirmsFirm B: Left Firm B: RightFirm A: Top $4 , $2 $3 , $3Firm A: Bottom $2 , $1 $1 , $0 Does Firm A have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?Does Firm B have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?Which outcomes are a Nash Equilibrium in this game? (If applicable, choose the option that includes all Nash Equilibria.)

If a 2 × 2 (2 players with 2 actions each) normal form (matrix) game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria then: (A) Neither player has a dominant strategy. (B) Exactly one player has a dominant strategy. (C) At least one player has a dominant strategy. (D) Both players have dominant strategies. (E) None of the above is necessarily true

In a dominant-strategy equilibriumGroup of answer choicesNone of the other answers are correct.Every player adopts a strategy that guarantees that the tota payoffs generated are minimised.Each player's strategy is their best choice, regardless as to the choice of action of its rivals.Each player's strategy is its dominant strategy, but only provided every player also adopts their dominant strategy.Every player adopts a strategy and the total payoffs generated for the players are maximised.

In the game matrix below, the first payoff in each pair goes to player A who chooses the row, and the second payoff goes to player B, who chooses the column. Let a, b, c, and d be positive constants. Left；Top a,1 ，Bottom 1.c Right：Top b.l，Bottom 1,d If player A chooses Bottom and player B chooses Right in a Nash equilibrium, then we know that

If each player in a game has a strictly dominant strategy, then:Group of answer choicesthe Nash equilibrium is welfare-maximising.each player achieves a maximum payoff in equilibrium.the game has no equilibrium.there cannot be multiple equilibria.the game can only played once.

In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.)Which is true for the following game according to the solution concept of iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies?  A  B Ca  1,4  -2,-2   4,0b  6,2 -2,3 3,-6c 5,-1 -1,0 5,2d 0,0 0,3 5,4 Player 2 is guaranteed a payoff of 4. None of the other alternatives is true. The strategy profiles (c,C) and (d,C) solve the game. The unique strategy profile that solves the game is (d,C). The unique strategy profile that solves the game is (b,A). Player 1 is guaranteed a payoff of 6.