Select all statements that are false.[Note that this quesiton allows partial marks. Each correct answer is awarded equal marks, but if you choose a wrong answer you will be awarded negative marks, with a lower bound 0, so you do not receive negative score in any question. For example, if there are two true statements, then you are awarded 1 mark for each true statement you choose, and you are awarded -1 mark for each false statement you pick.] In an extensive-form game, a Nash equilibrium cannot include non-credible threats If there are more than one subgame perfect equilibria, then a player must be indifferent between their actions at some node In an extensive-form game, the whole game tree is also a subgame. The number of subgames in an extensive form game tree equals the total number of nodes in the tree, including the terminal nodes ('leaves')

Which is false for the following game?1 \2 L C RT 3, 2 0, 3 3, 3M 5, 0 4, 1 3, 1B 2, 2 4, 5 1, 1(A) (M,C) and (B,C) are the only pure strategy Nash Equilibria(B) There is a Nash equilibrium in which R is played with positive probability(C) There is no Nash equilibrium in which L is played with positive probability(D) There is no Nash equilibrium in which both players choose two of their actions with positiveprobability

To find credible equilibria we solve the game backwards to eliminate non-credible threats.Group of answer choicesTrueFalse

Choose the correct combination of words to fill the blanks in the following sentences explaining the conditions for Nash equilibrium to be established. Note that blanks with the same alphabet are filled with the same words.-----Rationality alone (A) guarantee that Nash equilibria are played. To play Nash equilibria, players need (B). One way that makes (B) is (C). If players can reach (D) in (C), they can play a Nash equilibrium.----- 1 pointA= does not , B = correct beliefs, C = pre-play communication, and D = self-enforcing agreement. 
 A= does not , B = unlimited capacity of reasoning, C = pre-play communication, and D= self-enforcing agreement. 
 A= does , B = unlimited capacity of reasoning , C = trial and error adjustment, and D= self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 A= does , B = correct beliefs, C = trial and error adjustment, and D= self- fulfilling prophecy.

A subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium thatGroup of answer choicescan only be achieved if the game is played repeatedlyinvolves only credible threats.consists only of dominant strategies.is uniquenone of the other answers are correct

A normal form game can only have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if it has at least two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Question 1 Select one: True False