Assume that the economy consists of two infinitely lived consumers namedi=1, 2. There is one nonstorable consumption good. Consumericonsumesc ti at time t. Consumer i's preferences over consumption streams are represented by \[ \mathrm{E}_{0} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \log \left(c_{t}^{i}\right) \quad \beta \in(0,1) \] The endowments are decided each period by a toss of a fair coin. If the outcome of the coin toss is heads(H), consumer 1 receives one unit of the consumption good, and consumer 2 receives nothing. If the outcome is tails(T), consumer 2 receives one unit of the consumption good, and consumer 1 receives nothing. (i) Lets t ={H,T}denote the state of the economy at datet.q t0 (s t )denotes the time 0 price of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one unit of consumption in datetconditional on states t , andc t′ (s t )denotes consumer is consumption at datetin states t . Define an Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium. (ii) Compute the equilibrium under the assumption that Arrow-Debreu securities are traded in time 0 after the realizations 0 =H. Explain your answer.
Question
Assume that the economy consists of two infinitely lived consumers namedi=1, 2. There is one nonstorable consumption good. Consumericonsumesc ti at time t. Consumer i's preferences over consumption streams are represented by The endowments are decided each period by a toss of a fair coin. If the outcome of the coin toss is heads(H), consumer 1 receives one unit of the consumption good, and consumer 2 receives nothing. If the outcome is tails(T), consumer 2 receives one unit of the consumption good, and consumer 1 receives nothing. (i) Lets t ={H,T}denote the state of the economy at datet.q t0 (s t )denotes the time 0 price of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one unit of consumption in datetconditional on states t , andc t′ (s t )denotes consumer is consumption at datetin states t . Define an Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium. (ii) Compute the equilibrium under the assumption that Arrow-Debreu securities are traded in time 0 after the realizations 0 =H. Explain your answer.
Solution
(i) A Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of prices for Arrow-Debreu securities such that, given these prices, each consumer maximizes their utility subject to their budget constraint, and the markets for the securities clear.
In this economy, there are two consumers, 1 and 2, and one nonstorable consumption good. The endowments of the consumption good are determined by a fair coin toss each period. If the outcome is heads (H), consumer 1 receives one unit of the consumption good, and consumer 2 receives nothing. If the outcome is tails (T), consumer 2 receives one unit of the consumption good, and consumer 1 receives nothing.
The preferences of consumer i over consumption streams are represented by the discounted sum of logarithmic utility, where β is a discount factor between 0 and 1.
(ii) To compute the equilibrium, we need to determine the prices of the Arrow-Debreu securities. Since the securities are traded in time 0 after the realization of 0 = H, the price of the security that pays one unit of consumption in date t conditional on state t is denoted as q t0 (s t ).
In this case, after the realization of 0 = H, consumer 1 receives one unit of the consumption good. Therefore, the price of the Arrow-Debreu security for consumer 1 in state H is 1. On the other hand, consumer 2 receives nothing in state H, so the price of the Arrow-Debreu security for consumer 2 in state H is 0.
Since the markets for the securities must clear, the sum of the quantities demanded by consumers 1 and 2 in each state must equal the total endowment of the consumption good in that state. In state H, consumer 1 demands one unit of the consumption good, and consumer 2 demands nothing. Therefore, the equilibrium prices for the Arrow-Debreu securities in state H are q H0 (H) = 1 and q H0 (T) = 0.
In summary, the equilibrium prices for the Arrow-Debreu securities after the realization of 0 = H are q H0 (H) = 1 and q H0 (T) = 0.
Similar Questions
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