In an extensive form game, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) strategy is always the same as the SPNE path.Group of answer choicesTrueFalse

A subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium thatGroup of answer choicescan only be achieved if the game is played repeatedlyinvolves only credible threats.consists only of dominant strategies.is uniquenone of the other answers are correct

n a Nash equilibriumGroup of answer choicesOne player only plays their best response to their rivals’ strategiesAll players play their best responses to their rivals’ strategiesEvery player always plays their dominant strategySurplus is always maximisedNone of the above

Which of the following statements is true? I. If a two-player game has a strictly dominant strategy for one player, then it must have a strictly dominant strategy for the other player. II. If a strategy is strictly dominant, then it is also weakly dominant. III. A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is always a Nash Equilibrium in the normal form of the game Group of answer choices I and II are correct I and III are correct II and III are correct I, II and III are correct None of the other answers are correct

If each player in a game has a strictly dominant strategy, then:Group of answer choicesthe Nash equilibrium is welfare-maximising.each player achieves a maximum payoff in equilibrium.the game has no equilibrium.there cannot be multiple equilibria.the game can only played once.

Consider the following game.   L M2 RU 0,4 2,3 1,1M1 3.2 2,3 3,2D 9,2 1,1 2,2Which option has all Nash equilibria and nothing else?Group of answer choices(D,L) and (M1, M2)(M1,R)(M1,R) and (M1, L)(D,R), (D,L), and (M1, M2)(M1,M2)(U,R)