In a 3-player game, S subscript 1 equals S subscript 2 equals S subscript 3 equals left square bracket 0 comma 5 right square bracket. Each player obtains a payoff of 1 if her strategy equals the absolute value of the difference of the strategies of the other two players, and a payoff of 0 otherwise. Choose all of the following strategy profiles which are Nash equilibria. (0,0,0) (4,4,4) (2,2,4) (2,1,3) (2,2,0) (0,2,4)

In a 2-player game the payoff function of player 1 is given by u subscript 1 left parenthesis s subscript 1 comma s subscript 2 right parenthesis equals left parenthesis 4 minus s subscript 1 right parenthesis s subscript 2 plus 8, where s subscript 1 denotes a strategy of player 1 and s subscript 2 a strategy of player 2. Suppose that S subscript 1 equals S subscript 2 equals left square bracket 7 comma 9 right square bracket (that is, all real values from 7 to 9, including 7 and 9) are the strategy sets of players 1 and 2, respectively. Write down the strategy of player 1 which is strongly dominant. You must format your answer as follows: Enter 8 for strategy s subscript 1 equals 8, enter 8.5 for strategy s subscript 1 equals 8.5, and so on. If none of player 1's strategies is strongly dominant, enter negative 1.

Consider the following game in which Sally can play T or B and John chooses between L or R. Each player makes their choice simultaneously. If Sally chooses T and John chooses L ,Sally gets a payoff of 3 and John has a payoff of 7. If Sally plays T and John R, Sally’s payoff is 2 and John gets 1. If Sally Chooses B and John L, the payoffs are 1 to Sally and 2 to John. Finally, if Sally chooses B and John R, the payoffs are 4 to Sally and 3 to John. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices(T,R)(B,R)(T,L) and (B,R)(T,L)None of the above

Consider the following game. Player A and B simultaneously choose to work on either Project 1 (P1) or Project 2 (P2). The payoffs are as follows: if both players choose P1 the payoffs are 6 to A and 2 to B; if A chooses P1 and B chooses P2 the payoffs are 0 to each party; likewise, if A chooses P2 and B chooses P1 the payoffs are 0 to each party; and, finally, if A chooses P2 and B P2 the payoffs are 3 to both players. What are all of the Nash equilibria of this game? a. (P1, P1) b. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) c. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 1/3, Player B plays P1 with probability 1/2) d. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 3/5, Player B plays P1 with probability 1/3) e. (P1, P2), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 1/2, Player B plays P1 with probability 2/3)

Consider the following game.   L M2 RU 0,4 2,3 1,1M1 3.2 2,3 3,2D 9,2 1,1 2,2Which option has all Nash equilibria and nothing else?Group of answer choices(D,L) and (M1, M2)(M1,R)(M1,R) and (M1, L)(D,R), (D,L), and (M1, M2)(M1,M2)(U,R)

In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.)   A  B  C  D a  1,2  1,0  2,1  0,-3 b  1,4  3,5  2,0  1,2 c  -1,1  4,1  4,-1  -1,2 d  0,0  -2,-1  5,2  -1,0Select all of the following that are Nash equilibria in the above game. (Note: partial credit is possible for this question.) (1,2) (a,A) (d,C) (b,B) (3,5) (c,B)