Consider a location game with two ice cream vendors, where there are five possible locations: 0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, and 1. There are many customers, and they are uniformly distributed along the street between 0 and 1. Each customer goes to the nearest vendor. If vendors are located at the same place, they split their customers equally. A vendor’s payoff is the number of customers she/he gets. Vendors simultaneously choose their locations.QuestionWhat is the Nash equilibrium of this game?Hint: If you are unsure about this question, review lecture 1-9.1 pointVendors are located on 0 and 1. None of the above. Both choose 1/2. Vendors are located on 1/4 and 3/4.

et’s recall the location game we considered in Lecture 1-9. In the lecture, we examined a case in which two ice-cream vendors compete for customers on one street. In this problem, we consider other scenarios, i.e., there are three or four vendors on the same street.Note that venders choose a location in [0,1][0,1], and the rules of the game are the same as in the lecture:Customers are uniformly distributed along the street.Customers go to the nearest vendor. If multiple vendors occupy the same position, they split the customers equally.The vendor’s payoff is the number of customers.Examples: Three vendors compete on a street.

NASH equilibrium

Two restaurant proprietors, James and May, must simultaneously decide on the locations of their restaurants. The choices are on Pitt Street (P) or King Street (K). If both opt for P, the payoffs are (10, 20) to James and May, respectively. If both proprietors opt for K the payoffs are (10, 8). If James choose P and May chooses K, the payoffs are (5, 4). Finally, if James chooses K and May chooses P, the payoffs are (7, 3). The Nash equilibrium/equilibria is/are . This is a game

Consider the following game in which Sally can play T or B and John chooses between L or R. Each player makes their choice simultaneously. If Sally chooses T and John chooses L, Sally gets a payoff of 3 and John has a payoff of 7. If Sally plays T and John R, Sally’s payoff is 5 and John gets 1. If Sally Chooses B and John L, the payoffs are 1 to Sally and 2 to John. Finally, if Sally chooses B and John R, the payoffs are 4 to Sally and 3 to John. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices(T,L) and (B,R)(T,L)(B,R)None of the other answers are correct.(T, R)

Consider two restaurants, R1 and R2, simultaneously decide what sort of cuisine they will focus on, Thai (T) or Vietnamese (V). If both opt for T, the payoffs are 10 each. If both opt for V, the payoffs are 20 each. If R1 plays T and R2 V the payoffs are (30, 40). If R1 plays V and R2 T, the payoffs are (50, 60) for R1 and R2, respectively. What are the Nash equilibria?Group of answer choices(V, V)(T, T)(T, T) and (V, V); this is a coordination game(T, V) and (V, T); this is a coordination game.None of the above.