Question 2In the coordination game without correct beliefs, which of these can occur? 1 pointBelief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is predictable. Players actually play a Nash equilibrium, and which equilibrium is played is predictable. Players actually play a Nash equilibrium, and which equilibrium is played is unpredictable. Belief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is unpredictable.

onsider the following two-player game with three actions for each player. How many Nash equilibria are there? (If you are familiar with the concept of mixed strategies, do not count the mixed equilibria.)1 point12342.Question 2In the coordination game without correct beliefs, which of these can occur? 1 pointBelief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is predictable. Belief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is unpredictable.

Question 5What kind of insights does the Coordination Game provide? Choose all applicable statements.1 pointThere can be many Nash equilibria in a game. The popular computer keyboard design was inherited from typewriters. Players can always coordinate on the optimal outcome. The de facto standard of a new technology may not be efficient.A game might have good and bad Nash equilibria (the former are better than the latter for everyone). There is a unique self-fulfilling prophecy. 6.Question 6Which game has no mixed Nash equilibrium, i.e., no

Choose the correct combination of words to fill the blanks in the following sentences explaining the conditions for Nash equilibrium to be established. Note that blanks with the same alphabet are filled with the same words.-----Rationality alone (A) guarantee that Nash equilibria are played. To play Nash equilibria, players need (B). One way that makes (B) is (C). If players can reach (D) in (C), they can play a Nash equilibrium.----- 1 pointA= does not , B = correct beliefs, C = pre-play communication, and D = self-enforcing agreement. 
 A= does not , B = unlimited capacity of reasoning, C = pre-play communication, and D= self-enforcing agreement. 
 A= does , B = unlimited capacity of reasoning , C = trial and error adjustment, and D= self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 A= does , B = correct beliefs, C = trial and error adjustment, and D= self- fulfilling prophecy.

Concerning the above question 3, which of the following statements is correct? 1 pointThis game is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma in that it has a better outcome than Nash equilibrium for all players. This game is similar to the coordination game in that there are two Nash equilibria. This game is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma in that Nash equilibrium is a better outcome than every other outcome for all players. This game is similar to the coordination game in that each player’s objective is to match his/her behavior with the others.

Question 6Which game has no mixed Nash equilibrium, i.e., no Nash equilibrium where at least one player chooses random behavior? Choose the correct game with a correct reason. 1 pointThe coordination game, because payoffs for each player are the same across two Nash equilibria. The battle of the Sexes, because players have made a promise where to visit during the next holiday. The matching pennies, because the result of a coin-toss trial can be perfectly predicted by today’s science. The prisoner’s dilemma, because defection is best for both players and they do not consider that mutual cooperation can be attained.