Consider the location game between two bakeries, Pie Belly and the Lazy Croissant. Pie Belly moves first, chooses to locate either in the Mall or on the Side Alley. Observing this, the Lazy Croissant then chooses its location, which can similarly be in the Mall or on the Side Alley. The payoffs are as follows: if both firms choose Mall the payoffs are (50, 30) to Pie Belly and the Lazy Croissant; if Pie Belly chooses Mall and the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley the payoffs are (40, 40); if Pie Belly chooses the Side Alley and the Lazy Croissant opts for the Mall, the payoffs are (60, 35); and if both firms opt for the Side Alley the payoffs are (30, 20) respectively. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Mall and then the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley; there is a second-mover advantageIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Side Alley and then the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley; there is a second-mover advantageIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Side Alley and then the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley; there is a first-mover advantageIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Side Alley and then the Lazy Croissant the Mall; there is a first-mover advantageNone of the above statements are true

Two restaurant proprietors, James and May, must simultaneously decide on the locations of their restaurants. The choices are on Pitt Street (P) or King Street (K). If both opt for P, the payoffs are (10, 20) to James and May, respectively. If both proprietors opt for K the payoffs are (10, 8). If James choose P and May chooses K, the payoffs are (5, 4). Finally, if James chooses K and May chooses P, the payoffs are (7, 3). The Nash equilibrium/equilibria is/are . This is a game

et’s recall the location game we considered in Lecture 1-9. In the lecture, we examined a case in which two ice-cream vendors compete for customers on one street. In this problem, we consider other scenarios, i.e., there are three or four vendors on the same street.Note that venders choose a location in [0,1][0,1], and the rules of the game are the same as in the lecture:Customers are uniformly distributed along the street.Customers go to the nearest vendor. If multiple vendors occupy the same position, they split the customers equally.The vendor’s payoff is the number of customers.Examples: Three vendors compete on a street.

Two restaurants, Fried Bird and Tofu Delights, are simultaneously choosing their locations. Either firm can either choose to locate in the City or in the Suburbs. The payoffs are as follows. If one firm choose City and the other Suburbs, each firm gets 0. If both firms go to the City, Fried Bird gets 5 and Tofu Delights 10. If both opt for the Suburbs, Fried Bird gets 15 and Tofu Delights 2. What are the Nash equilibria?Group of answer choices(Suburbs, Suburbs)(City, City) and (Suburbs, Suburbs)(City, Suburbs) and (Suburbs, City)(City, City)(Suburbs, City)

Consider a location game with two ice cream vendors, where there are five possible locations: 0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, and 1. There are many customers, and they are uniformly distributed along the street between 0 and 1. Each customer goes to the nearest vendor. If vendors are located at the same place, they split their customers equally. A vendor’s payoff is the number of customers she/he gets. Vendors simultaneously choose their locations.QuestionWhat is the Nash equilibrium of this game?Hint: If you are unsure about this question, review lecture 1-9.1 pointVendors are located on 0 and 1. None of the above. Both choose 1/2. Vendors are located on 1/4 and 3/4.

Mary can choose to open her restaurant in Darlinghurst (D) or Newtown (N). Mary’s choice is observed by Jim, who can then choose to set up his establishment in either D or N. If Mary chooses D and then Jim D, the payoffs are (80, 40) to Mary and Jim, respectively. If the actions are (D, N), the payoffs are (40, 50). If the actions taken by the two restauranteurs are N followed by D, the payoffs are (30, 40). Finally, if the actions are (N, N) the payoffs are (50, 80). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibria, what actions do we see being played by Mary and Jim, respectively?Group of answer choicesN and ND and ND and DN and DNone of the other answers are correct