Consider the technology choices for a new phone handset for the iPhone and Galaxy by their respective head companies. Both firms can simultaneously choose either technology 1 (T1) or technology 2 (T2). The payoffs from a choice of (T1, T1) is 20 for each firm (note that the first term relates to Galaxy and the second iPhone). If both firms go for T2, the payoffs are 30 for each firm. If the strategies adopted are (T2, T1), the payoffs are (50, 80). Finally, if the strategies adopted are (T1, T2) the payoffs are (60, 70) for Galaxy and iPhone respectively. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesThe Nash equilibrium is (T1, T1)The Nash equilibrium is (T2, T2)The Nash equilibrium is (T1, T2)The Nash equilibria are (T1, T1) and (T2, T2); this is an example of firms adopting a minimal product differentiation strategy.The Nash equilibria are (T2, T1) and (T1, T2); this is an example of firms adopting a maximal differentiation strategy.

Consider the phone handset market. Assume there are just two firms making phones – Apple and Samsung. The timing of the game is as follows. Apple first chooses whether to Launch a new phone or Wait. Observing this, Samsung then decides itself whether to Launch or Wait. The payoffs of the game are as follows. If Apple Launches, then Samsung also Launches, the returns are 12 each. If both firms Wait, the payoffs are 15 each. If Apple launches, then Samsung Waits the payoff is 30 to Apple and 20 to Samsung. If Apples Waits and Samsung then Launches the payoffs are 20 and 30 to Apple and Samsung, respectively. What is the outcome in the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium?Group of answer choicesApple Waits, Samsung LaunchesBoth firms LaunchApple Wait, Samsung WaitsApple Launches, Samsung WaitsNone of the other answers are correct.

Consider Apple and Samsung considering developing an entering a new market (by developing a new type of device). The timing of the game is that Apple gets to choose whether to Enter (E) or to Not Enter (NE). Then, observing its rival’s choice, Samsung gets to choose whether to E or to NE. If both firms enter (E) the payoff is -5 to each firm. If both firms do not enter (NE) they each get a profit of 2. If one enters and the other chooses to NE, the entrant gets 10 and the other firm gets a profit of 0. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung also Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung chooses NE; there is a first-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung also chooses to Not Enter; there is a first-mover advantageNone of the above

The cell phone division of a multinational corporation has granted its research and development department funds to create new technologies to ensure the organization stays ahead of its competitors in the market. This decision by the cell phone division is an example of the organization's _____ strategy.Multiple Choicetop-levelbusiness-levelfunctional-leveldepartmental-level

Mazda and Toyota are considering developing new technology for electric cars. The timing of the game is as follows. Mazda chooses whether to develop Technology 1 (T1) or technology 2 (T2). This choice of Mazda is observed by Toyota. Then Toyota chooses whether to invest in T1 or T2. The profits to the first are: if both invest in T1 the payoffs are (5, 10) for Mazda and Toyota respectively; if both firms invest in T2 the payoffs are (5, 10); if one firm invests in T1 and the other T2, the payoffs are (10, 5) for Mazda and Toyota. In the credible equilibria, what do we observe as the outcome of the game, and is there a first- or second-mover advantage?Group of answer choicesMazda invests in T1 and Toyota invests in T2; there is a first-mover advantageMazda invests in T1 and Toyota invests in T2; there is a second-mover advantageMazda invests in T1 and Toyota invests in T1; there is a first-mover advantageMazda invests in T2 and Toyota invests in T1; there is a first-mover advantageWe observe that Toyota always invests in the same technology as Mazda (be it T1 or T2); there is a second-mover advantage

A shopkeeper bought two mobile phones in ₹ 8000. If he sells 1st phone at 20% profit and 2nd phone at 15% profit he earns certain profit. But if he sells 1st phone at 15% profit and 2nd phone at 20% profit he gets ₹ 100 more. Find the price of both the phones.₹ 3500, ₹ 4500₹ 3000, ₹ 5000₹ 4000, ₹ 4000₹ 2000, ₹ 6000